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Abstract 
 
Public defenders and other court actors most often 
engage in behind-the-scene plea negotiating to manage 
overwhelming workloads and to dispose of cases as 
quickly and efficiently as possible. In prior work, scholars 
have documented an increased reliance on plea 
bargaining and the deleterious impact of the practice on 
the legal process and the rights of individuals accused of 
a crime; however, this research has not systematically 
analyzed the decisions made, and the perspectives of 
justice of society’s most disadvantaged and arguably most 
important actors of the court, the defendants. Relying on 
data collected in a Midwestern public defense system, this 
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article focuses attention to the intersection of indigent 
defense and plea bargaining by shedding light on the 
decision-making processes and perceptions of justice 
among indigent defendants. Our findings indicate that 
regardless of innocence, defendants plead guilty because 
it offers the quickest pathway out of court and with little 
risk; however, misunderstanding and fear often mediate 
decisions to plead guilty. Also, while the majority of 
defendants perceive the plea outcome to be fair, they do 
not always perceive the plea process as fair. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 The United States formalized the provision of 
public defense through the passage of the 6th 
Amendment in 1789 and the unanimous ruling by the 
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Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963.1 Since 
this time, attorneys assigned to provide public defense 
services to individuals who are accused of a crime, but 
unable to afford legal counsel, have struggled with 
demanding caseloads and a lack of funding to support 
their work.2 To manage overwhelming workloads, 
defense attorneys and prosecutors engage in behind-the-
scene negotiating to dispose of cases as quickly and 
efficiently as possible.3  Because negotiations result in 
pleas of guilty in over ninety percent of cases, a large body 
of research has considered the implications of plea 
                                               
1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 344 (1963). While the 
original decision of the Court applied to adult, felony 
proceedings, the mandate has since been extended to 
misdemeanor, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); 
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002), and juvenile 
proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). 
2 See Eve Brensike Primus, Defense Counsel and Public 
Defense, in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL 
PROCESSES 121, 121 (Erik Luna ed., 2017); Michael Barrett, 
The Impact of Neglecting Indigent Defense on the Economics of 
Criminal Justice, 61 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 681, 682–86 (2016) (using 
Missouri’s public defender’s system to demonstrate the funding 
issues); ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N. OF 
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The 
Terrible Toll of American’s Broken Misdemeanor Court 26 
(2009), https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/ [https:// 
perma.cc/UZ79-VWKH]; NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICAN’S 
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 52–64 (2009), https://constitutionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GB7-UWZK].  
3 See generally MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE 
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 
(1979); GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A 
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003); PETER F. 
NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978); Donald A. Dripps, 
Guilt, Innocence, and Due Process of Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. 
& MARY L. REV 1343 (2015). 
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negotiations on criminal justice actors, including 
attorneys, prosecutors, and the judiciary.4 Very little 
research, however, has considered the impact of plea 
negotiations on the individuals whose lives are most 
affected by the practice: the defendants.  
 The goal of this research is to examine how the 
practice of plea-bargaining influences indigent defendant 
decision-making, court experiences, and perspectives of 
justice. Research on plea bargaining dates back to the 
1920s and 1930s, prior to the passage of the 6th 
Amendment. Scholarly works by Miller and Moley in 
1927 and 1928, and the publication of the Wickersham 
Commission report in 1931, for example, are highly 
regarded for their early considerations of plea bargaining 
on the legal doctrine of criminal court procedures.5 
Notably, in the first published issue of Southern 
California Law Review, Miller opens an article entitled, 
“The Compromised of Criminal Cases” with the 
statement, “In theory there should be no compromise of 
criminal cases,” but “[i]n practice, [] the condonation and 
compromise of criminal cases is frequent and the 
methods of evading the clear purpose of the written law 
are varied.”6 
Since these early publications, scholars have 
documented an increased reliance on plea bargaining and 
the deleterious impact of the practice on the legal process 
and the rights of individuals accused of a crime. Legal 
advocates argue that because pleas of guilty are 
                                               
4 BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE., FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 — STATISTICAL 
TABLES 22, 24 (2013); LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING (2011).  
5 See 4 NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T 
(WICKERSHAM COMM’N), REPORT ON PROSECUTION 95–97 
(1931); Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 
97 (1928); Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1927). 
6 Miller, supra note 5, at 1–2.  
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negotiated and agreed to outside of the courtroom and in 
advance of sentencing, the plea process reallocates 
control over sentencing decisions from the judiciary to the 
prosecution.7 Because cases are so quickly resolved 
through pleas of guilty, evidentiary and legal issues are 
often suppressed and case investigation ceases to exist.8 
The formulaic agreements on which plea bargains rely 
often overlook the identity of those who are accused of a 
crime, and thereby eliminate individualized mitigation 
and consideration of rehabilitative responses.9 Moreover, 
those accused of a crime find themselves pressured into 
admitting guilt for fear of missing an opportunity to 
decrease punishment versus extending the work of the 
court which may result in harsher sentences down the 
road. In 1978, Langbein went so far as to compare plea 
bargaining to torture, stating that although our means 
may be politer—“we use no rack, no thumbscrew, no 
Spanish boot to mash his legs”—we still make it costly for 
an individual accused of a criminal offense to claim their 
constitutional rights.10  
These concerns call attention to the importance of 
understanding the impact of plea bargaining on the 
experiences and perspectives of defendants and, in 
                                               
7 MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 37, 67–68 (1998); 
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2004).  
8 FEELEY, supra note 3.  
9 See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 
951 (1991) (“These guidelines also mark a changed attitude 
toward sentencing—one that looks to collections of cases and 
to social harm rather than to individual offenders and the 
punishments they deserve.”);  Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, 
Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old 
Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (1989) (“One problem 
underscored in this scholarship is that individual concrete 
human voices and abstract, general legal rules often conflict.”). 
10 John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 3, 12 (1978). 
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particular, those defendants who cannot afford to retain 
legal counsel. Today, indigent defendants compose the 
majority of the criminal justice system, with research 
indicating that between 60 percent and 90 percent of 
defendants rely on court-appointed attorneys.11 In an 
effort to highlight the experiences of the defendants who 
most frequently interact with the criminal courts and the 
plea process, this research utilizes semi-structured 
interview data with defendants and administrative court 
data collected in a Midwestern urban public defense 
system between the years of 2008 to 2011. In the 
following pages, we outline research related to the 
intersection of public defense and plea bargaining, and 
the decision-making process of indigent defendants and 
perceptions of justice, in an effort to better understand 
how criminal court processes are perceived by the 
individuals who are most directly affected by their 
outcomes. Our findings indicate that regardless of 
innocence, defendants plead guilty because it offers the 
quickest pathway out of court and with little risk; 
however, misunderstanding and fear often permeate 
decisions to plead guilty. While the majority of 
defendants perceive the plea outcome to be fair, they do 
not always perceive the plea process as fair.  
 
II. Plea Bargaining in Public Defense 
 
It is well-documented that the plea process has 
become a cornerstone of the criminal justice system in the 
decades since its introduction and indoctrination in the 
late 1700s and 1800s. During this era, criminal justice 
                                               
11 JUSTICE POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF 
UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE 2 (2011); LYNN LANGTON 
& DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC 
DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES (2009); Carol 
J. Defrances & Marika F.X. Litras, Indigent Defense Services 
in Large Counties, 1999, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice), Nov. 2000, at 1. 
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grew into a professional institution, incorporating formal 
police departments and court officials who became 
“repeat players” in criminal cases.12 Accordingly, the 
court workgroup became accustomed to the routine 
disposition of cases, and to the outcomes and sentences 
associated with taking a case to trial versus negotiating 
a plea deal. Once outcomes and sentences of pleas and 
trials became familiar to court actors, a “going rate” of 
the expected sentence developed such that the system 
became routine and bureaucratic and, in doing so, 
increased its capacity to process more cases and at a 
quicker rate.13  
Today, well over 90 percent of criminal cases are 
disposed through pleas of guilty. Most court actors, 
including prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judiciary, 
argue that plea bargaining is a necessary tool in the 
criminal courts, and particularly for those systems that 
are overwhelmed by cases and depleted in resources. 
Arguably, attorneys who are assigned to represent 
indigent defendants are one of the primary groups of 
court actors who are reliant on and benefit from the gains 
afforded by the plea process.14 Since the inception of 
                                               
12 FEELEY, supra note 3; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 149–55 (1993); LAWRENCE 
M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 
1870–1910 (1981); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND 
CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN 
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980). 
13 Jonathan D. Casper, Having Their Day in Court: Defendant 
Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 237 (1978); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: 
THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE 
ATTORNEYS (1981); ROTHMAN, supra note 12. 
14 Feeley and other scholars have argued that the plea process 
is “a mixed-strategy game” in which prosecution and defense 
“share in gains and losses.” FEELEY, supra note 3, at 27. For 
instance, “prosecutor[s] gain[] by securing convictions.” Id. 
Also, “defense gains certainty of outcome, and a reduction of 
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public defense following the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Gideon, the system has struggled with considerable 
challenges that shape the ability of public defenders to 
provide effective defense.15 High caseloads and a lack of 
funding constrain the amount of time that public 
defenders can spend with defendants and conducting 
case investigation.16 Even when attorneys are available 
to meet with defendants, stress related to overwhelming 
workloads may lead public defenders to encourage 
defendants to accept pleas of guilty in order to facilitate 
case resolution.17 In some cases, defendants may be 
approached with plea deals and plead guilty to 
misdemeanor offenses before ever meeting attorneys. A 
significant implication of these practices is that many 
defendants are pleading guilty to a crime without full 
knowledge or understanding of their rights, options, or 
the collateral consequences of the decision.  
 
  
                                               
the sentence.” Id. Further, “the state is also a beneficiary 
because it secures an admission of guilt, punishes the guilty, 
and yet saves the expense of a trial.” Id. 
15See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963) 
(holding that indigent defendants are entitled to 
representation, without indicating an infrastructure to allow 
for such defense); THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 
50–101. 
16 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 11, at 6. For example, 
although the American Bar Association (ABA) recommends 
that public defenders not exceed national caseload standards, 
many public defenders and, in particular those working in 
urban areas, typically manage double that amount of cases 
annually. SUZANNE M. STRONG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE-
ADMINISTERED INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, 2013 at 5 (2016). 
17 SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN INDIANA: 
EVALUATION OF TRIAL LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 
169–70 (2016); NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. SERVS., A RACE TO THE 
BOTTOM: SPEED & SAVINGS OVER DUE PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 39–40 (2008). 
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III. Deciding to Plead Guilty 
 
With approximately 6 million indigent individuals 
receiving public defense services annually, and the 
majority pleading guilty to a crime, it is critically 
important to consider why individuals who are accused of 
a crime decide to accept pleas of guilty. There is little 
theoretical guidance on the decision-making processes of 
defendants; however, there is some support to suggest 
that theories of court worker decision-making may be 
applicable to the decisions that defendants make.  
The extent research on court worker decision-
making offers three theories by which to interpret court 
worker decisions to employ plea bargaining strategies. 
First, organizational efficiency theories argue that 
disparities in sentencing are the result of court actors 
rewarding behavior and attitudes that are valued by the 
institution—because court actors value the time and 
resource-savings afforded by quick pleas of guilty, 
defendants who accept plea bargains are rewarded with 
less severe sentences.18 Albonetti, for example, states, 
“Defendant cooperation exemplified by a willingness to 
plead guilty is viewed, by the sentencing judge, as an 
indication of the defendant’s willingness to ‘play the 
game’ in a routine, system defined manner.” 19 Second, 
theories of uncertainty avoidance argue that defendants 
                                               
18 PETER NARDULLI, JAMES EISENSTEIN & ROY B. FLEMMING, 
THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY 
PLEA PROCESS 203–05 (1988); Jo Dixon, The Organizational 
Context of Criminal Sentencing, 100 AM. J. SOC. 1157, 1157–58 
(1995); Rodney L. Engen & Sara Steen, The Power to Punish: 
Discretion and Sentencing Reform in the War on Drugs, 105 
AM. J. SOC. 1357, 1363 (2000); Malcolm D. Holmes, Howard C. 
Daudistel & William A. Taggart, Plea Bargaining Policy and 
State District Court Caseloads: An Interrupted Time Series 
Analysis, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 139 (1992). 
19 Celesta A. Albonetti, Criminality, Prosecutorial Screening, 
and Uncertainty: Toward a Theory of Discretionary Decision-
Making in Felony Cases, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 623 (1986). 
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are rewarded for pleading guilty because trials are an 
inherently uncertain and stressful event for court 
actors—decisions to pursue trials require prosecutors, 
defenders, and judiciary to manage unreliable or 
disreputable witnesses, questionable testimony, and/or 
the use of less-direct evidence which may or may not 
influence a decision of guilt. Plea deals are therefore 
encouraged to reduce the uncertainty of decisions and 
outcomes. A final theory, and one that is highlighted by 
the sentencing guidelines, argues that the decision to 
plead guilty as opposed to taking a case to trial is 
associated with differences in perceived 
blameworthiness.20 The federal guidelines state that 
defendants should receive guideline-based sentencing 
discounts or departures for “acceptance of responsibility” 
and “substantial assistance to law enforcement.”21 Thus, 
defendants who plead guilty, and therefore accept 
responsibility, are rewarded with lighter sentences than 
those who may not be perceived as accepting 
responsibility and showing remorse for behavior. 
In contrast to arguments that plea bargaining is a 
coercive practice, there is some scholarly discussion to 
suggest that a defendant’s decision to accept a plea of 
guilty is arrived at through a rational decision-making 
process that is not dissimilar to the process by which 
court actors decide to employ plea bargaining. More 
specifically, advocates of plea bargaining argue that the 
process affords the defendant the opportunity to 
participate in a rational decision-making process 
whereby the costs associated with extending a case are 
weighed against the possibility of reduced sentencing or 
acquittal.22 Research in misdemeanor courts, in 
                                               
20 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2009). 
21 Id.  
22 Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1117, 1136–38 (2008); Candice McCoy, Plea Bargaining as 
Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea-Bargaining Reform, 50 
10
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particular, has shown that defendants care less about the 
outcome of the case and more about the efficiency 
provided by the plea process, which can offset financial 
costs and time investment associated with extending the 
length of cases.23 However, it might also be the case that 
an efficiency theory may only apply to defendants 
charged with less severe offenses. In other words, 
defendants who are charged with a misdemeanor offense 
that carries less severe sentencing outcomes might be 
more inclined to plead guilty to “get it over with”; 
whereas defendants charged with a felony offense that 
carries more severe sentencing outcomes might be more 
invested in the outcome of the case and, particularly if 
they believe they are innocent. Another argument 
suggests that defendants decide to enter a plea of guilty 
in an effort to decrease the uncertainty of verdicts that 
might be made by a jury or a judge at a later point in 
time. In this regard, theories of uncertainty avoidance 
argue that the plea process provides both defendants and 
court actors with respite from the stress associated with 
trial work.  Finally, defendant decision-making may be 
driven by blameworthiness. The decision to accept a plea 
of guilty, therefore, is made in an effort to accept 
responsibility and express remorse for the offense.  
 
IV. Perceptions of Justice 
 
Scholars often cite decision-making as an 
important contributing factor to overall perceptions of 
fairness and justice. Indeed, the most common criticism 
of plea bargaining is that the process limits the 
defendant’s ability to be involved in the procedures and 
decisions made in their case. This criticism, however, is 
                                               
CRIM. L.Q. 67, 69, 73 (2005); Bibas, supra note 7, at 2496–99, 
2507; Douglas A. Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949, 950–51 (1986); Langbein, 
supra note 10, at 8. 
23 FEELEY, supra note 3, at 187–89. 
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juxtaposed by scholars who argue that the plea process 
should be positively associated with perceptions of justice 
because the process requires defendants to make the 
decision about whether or not to accept a plea bargain, 
which is associated with the outcome of their case.24 
Despite the arguments on both sites, a relatively small 
body of research has actually considered the implications 
of plea bargaining on defendant experiences and 
perspectives of justice and fairness. The studies that do 
exist are more than thirty years old and rely on data 
collected in very different court settings than the ones 
defendants encounter today.25  
Classical work on how defendants perceive court 
experiences has focused on theories of distributive justice 
                                               
24 JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE 
DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE 94 (1972). 
25 For example, previous influential work on plea bargaining 
by CASPER, supra note 13, supra note 24, by Tom Tyler, The 
Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of their 
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW &  SOC’Y REV. 51 (1984), and by 
FEELEY, supra note 3, in the 1970s and 1980s predate 
mandatory sentencing laws and “tough on crime” policies that 
have reshaped courtroom justice and increased the stakes for 
defendants. The effect of these laws can be seen most directly 
in today’s record high jail and prison populations; however, 
“tough on crime” policies have also increased both the number 
of low-level, petty offenders charged in misdemeanor courts 
and increased the amount of time and cost necessary to defend 
criminal cases charged in felony courts, BORUCHOWITZ, supra 
note 2 at 7, 25. In addition, defendants today face more civil 
sanctions as a result of criminal convictions, including the loss 
of legal immigration status, public benefits, housing, driver’s 
license, and employment. BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2 at 7, 25; 
CASPER, supra note 13; CASPER, supra note 24; FEELEY, supra 
note 3; Tyler, supra note 25; Becky Pettit & Bruce 
Western, Mass Imprisonment and Life Course: Race and Class 
Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151, 153 
(2004); Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral 
Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State 
Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 10 (1996). 
12
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which extend early formulations of Adam’s equity theory 
to argue that individuals assess satisfaction with 
outcomes when they are perceived as comparable to the 
outcomes incurred by others.26 Research in a variety of 
contexts, including the courts, shows that distributive 
justice is an influential factor in determining individuals’ 
perception of outcome fairness.27 For example, Casper’s 
research in the 1970s shows that male defendants who 
consider their outcome to be fair are most likely to 
indicate that they perceive their sentence as a “good 
break,” or a reasonable sentence relative to the going rate 
for the offense.28  
In 1975, Thibaut and Walker moved beyond the 
basic assumptions of distributive justice by 
hypothesizing that satisfaction with court outcomes is 
independently influenced by perceptions of procedural 
justice—judgments about the fairness of the resolution 
process.29 Theories of procedural justice argue that 
evaluations of justice and outcome fairness are 
influenced by the opportunities that defendants have to 
be involved in the decisions made in their case (decision 
control) and the opportunities that defendants have to 
participate in the proceedings of their case by expressing 
                                               
26 J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES 
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267, 272–76 (Leonard 
Berkowetz ed., 1965). 
27 E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 10–12 (1988); Adams, supra note 26, at 
272–76; Dean B. McFarlin & Paul D. Sweeney, Distributive 
and Procedural Justice as Predictors of Satisfaction with 
Personal and Organizational Outcomes, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
626, 629, 634 (1992);  Robert Folger & Mary Konovsky, Effects 
of Procedural and Distributive Justice on Reactions to Pay 
Raise Decisions, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 115, 115–16 (1989); Jerald 
Greenberg, Organizational Justice: Yesterday, Today, and 
Tomorrow, 16 J. MGMT. 399, 400, 402–04, 406 (1987). 
28 CASPER, supra note 13. 
29 JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). 
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their side of the story and presenting personal 
information and evidence that is relevant to their case 
(process control). One of the most striking discoveries of 
the research completed by Thibaut and Walker was the 
finding that satisfaction and perceived fairness are 
affected by factors other than whether the defendant 
“won” or “lost” their case.30 In this regard, Thibaut and 
Walker’s research was the first to suggest that it is 
possible to enhance defendant’s perceptions of fair 
treatment without focusing explicitly on distributive 
fairness.  
More recently, scholars have extended theories of 
procedural justice to include the behaviors of the actors 
who implement legal processes, and to argue that 
perceptions of fairness are closely tied to legitimacy and 
the likelihood that individuals will obey the law.31 In this 
regard, if defendants perceive court processes and the 
behaviors of court actors, including publicly assigned 
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges, as fair, they 
will be more likely to view courts as legitimate and 
cooperate with their efforts and decisions. However, if 
defendants perceive the processes and the behaviors of 
court actors as unfair, they will be less likely to view 
courts as legitimate and subsequently less likely to 
cooperate with their efforts and decisions. Research on 
policing practice indicates that when police treat citizens 
                                               
30 Id; John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 
66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 548–49 (1978).  
31 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN HUO. TRUST IN THE LAW: 
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND 
COURTS (2002); Tom R. Tyler, Process Based Regulation: 
Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 
30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 297, 306–07, 309–10 (2003); Jason 
Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and 
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 513, 514, 523 (2003); Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. 
Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, 
Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 
CRIMINOLOGY 253, 263, 270 (2004). 
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fairly and with respect, police legitimacy is enhanced, as 
well as citizen cooperation and support of police officers, 
although limited research has focused specific attention 
to the association between perceptions of criminal court 
processes and actors, and legitimacy and law-abiding 
behavior.32  
 
V. Race and Class 
 
Particularly important to understanding how 
individuals accused of a crime make decisions to accept a 
plea of guilty and their perceptions of justice is the impact 
of race and class. When this research was conducted, 
black defendants accounted for 37 percent of adults aged 
40 or older and 55 percent of juveniles charged with a 
criminal offense in urban courts.33 Today, black 
individuals account for approximately 13 percent of the 
U.S. population,34 yet black men represent 
approximately 40 percent of incarcerated individuals.35 
In addition, at least 40 percent of individuals imprisoned 
cannot read, and over two-thirds are either unemployed 
                                               
32 Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by Design: The 
War on Drugs, Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice 
System, 73 SOC. RES. 445, 467–68 (2006); Sunshine & Tyler, 
supra note 31, at 514, 520; Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 31, at 
275–77; Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and 
Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in 
Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 239–40, 242 
(2008); Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan D. Casper & Bonnie Fisher, 
Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role 
of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 629, 645–46 (1989). 
33 REAVES, supra note 4, at 5. 
34 QuickFacts: Population Estimates, July 1, 2018, (V2018), 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ 
fact/table/US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/R3VH-SWKQ]. 
35 E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 
2016, at 7 (2018). 
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or underemployed when arrested.36  Decades of research 
on racial disparity and criminal justice, in conjunction 
with the most recent deadly encounters between law 
enforcement and black citizens, highlights the need to be 
cognizant of the impact of relentless policing efforts and 
harsh sentencing practices on the daily experiences of 
poor, black individuals who are accused of a crime.  
Crime policies in the 1980s and 1990s increased 
the presence of the criminal justice system in the lives of 
poor communities; the war on drugs, in particular, 
increased the frequency and type of police-citizen 
encounters in urban city areas. As a result, the criminal 
justice system has not only become a primary source of 
civic education for the poor but has led to distrust and 
disillusionment with the “system.” Previous research 
shows that this distrust has typically been directed 
towards law enforcement and is shaped by race.37 Zero-
tolerance policing and the use of aggressive police tactics 
                                               
36 BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 
(2006); MICHAEL H. TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING 
AMERICAN DILEMMA 12–13 (2011); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL 
JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); MICHAEL H. TONRY, 
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 
(1995); Kevin L. Jackson, Differences in the Background and 
Criminal Justice Characteristics of Young Black, White and 
Hispanic Male Federal Prison Inmates, 27 J. BLACK STUD. 494, 
497 (1997); David C. Leven, Curing America’s Addiction to 
Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 641, 646 (1993). 
37 Bobo & Thompson, supra note 32, at 467; Jon Hurwitz & 
Mark Peffley, Explaining the Great Racial Divide: Perceptions 
of Fairness in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 67 J. POL. 762, 
767 (2005); Ronald  Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Perceptions of 
Racial Profiling: Race, Class, and Personal Experience, 40 
CRIMINOLOGY 435, 443 (2002); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. 
Tuch, Race, Class, and Perceptions of Discrimination by the 
Police, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 494, 502 (1999); Richard 
Scaglion & Richard G. Condon, Determinants of Attitudes 
Toward City Police, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 485, 489 (1980). 
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have prompted accusations of racial profiling and 
contributed to tense relationships between law 
enforcement and residents of high-crime areas.  
Yet, the extent to which class and race are 
associated with negative attitudes towards criminal 
courts remains the subject of debate. It seems probable 
that negative perceptions of law enforcement would 
extend to the entire legal system. Bobo and Johnson, for 
example, argue that black individuals “are far more 
likely to believe” that the administration of criminal 
justice is “riddled with systematic bias” based on negative 
encounters with law enforcement.38 Hurwitz and Peffley 
argue that because legal perspectives are based 
predominantly on personal experiences with criminal 
justice actors in communities, negative interactions with 
law enforcement heavily contribute to an overall 
perception that the justice system as inherently unfair.39 
Moreover, Lind and Tyler assert that people who believe 
the justice system to be unfair tend to evaluate the entire 
political system as less legitimate—for much of the poor, 
the justice system is as close as individuals come to the 
government.40 Thus, low levels of support for police may 
bridge across institutions, undermine support for the 
broader system, and influence decision-making and 
perceptions of justice related to court processes and plea 
bargains.  
 
VI. The Current Study 
 
This study focuses attention to the intersection 
between public defense and plea bargaining, and the 
decision-making process of indigent defendants and 
                                               
38 Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste For 
Punishment: Black and White Americans’ Views on the Death 
Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DU BOIS REV. 151, 156–157 
(2004). 
39 Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 37, at 767.   
40 LIND & TYLER, supra note 27, at 70. 
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perceptions of justice. The overarching goal of this 
research is to raise awareness of and increase knowledge 
on the experiences of the individuals who are accused of 
a crime and, in particular, those who are financially 
unable to retain private counsel and therefore are reliant 
on the legal services of a public defender. In doing so, we 
rely on the theories of decision-making and perceptions 
of justice presented in the previous pages to guide our 
analysis but shift the prior application of these theories 
away from court actors and police to indigent defendants 
and the courts. The key research questions that guide 
this study include: 
 
1. Why do defendants plead guilty? 
2. How does the decision to accept a plea influence 
perspectives of case outcomes? 
3. Do defendants perceive the plea process as fair 
and why or why not? 
 
VII. Data and Methods 
 
The findings of this study are guided by 
qualitative and administrative data collected between 
the years of 2008 and 2011 in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court, located in Hennepin County, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. When this study was completed, Hennepin 
County was the largest county in Minnesota with a 
population of slightly over 1 million, or approximately 25 
percent of the state population.41 Hennepin County is one 
of ten judicial districts in Minnesota, and one of two 
judicial districts with a full-time public defender office. 
Over forty percent of the total number of adult criminal 
                                               
41 PopFinder For Minnesota, Counties, & Regions, MINN. STATE 
DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., https://mn.gov/admin/demography/data-
by-topic/population-data/our-estimates/pop-finder1.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/ZX8H-M5T8]. 
18
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 3
https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol13/iss2/3
PLEADING GUILTY 
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 459 (2019) 
 
[477] 
cases in the state were processed through the Hennepin 
County court. Black individuals comprised fifty percent 
of defendants who received the services of a public 
defender in Hennepin County; twenty-four percent were 
female (see Table 1 for a description of defendants). 
 Administrative data was obtained for all cases 
that were referred to Hennepin County between the 
years of 2008–2011. Qualitative data was collected in 
2010 and 2011 and relies on observational data collected 
in over 250 misdemeanor and felony cases across six 
public defenders and semi-structured interviews with 40 
defendants. Observations included defender-client 
interviews and meetings held in jail, custody, court, and 
defender offices, and defender-prosecutor negotiations 
held in judges’ chambers and in and outside of the 
courtroom. Cases observed for this study were not 
randomly selected, but rather, were dependent on the 
public defender’s calendar and the defendants that were 
assigned to the defender on a particular day. All 
defendants included in this research consented to the 
study during their first appearance with the public 
defender. Cases were tracked as they progressed through 
disposition, unless the case was dismissed, the defendant 
was rearrested, the case was transferred to a specialty 
court, or the defendant failed to appear.    
 Informal defendant interviews were conducted 
throughout the case, and forty defendants were formally 
interviewed following case disposition. Informal 
interviews with defendants typically occurred in court 
hallways while the defendants were waiting for their 
cases to be called and were used to collect data on what 
they understood to be happening in their cases, desired 
outcomes, perceptions of interactions with their public 
defender and the plea bargains that had been offered, as 
well as considerations for accepting or rejecting a plea 
offer. Formal interviews occurred in a designated, 
confidential space, including libraries, parks, and 
correctional institutions. Formal interviews lasted 
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anywhere from 30 minutes to 3 hours and included 
questions about defendants’ understanding of the 
procedures and outcome of their cases, the fairness of 
their outcomes, decisions made in their cases, 
experiences with their public defenders, and whether 
they felt as if race/ethnicity impacted their court 
experiences. Interviews also included questions taken 
from prior research with defendants by Tyler and Casper 
to collect data on procedural justice, including 
perceptions of the processes and outcomes of their cases, 
their ability to participate in the decisions made in their 
case, and whether they felt as if they had a voice and were 
respected.42   
 
A. Analytic Strategy 
 
Detailed notes were taken and recorded 
throughout this research. Formal interviews were audio 
recorded and transcribed for data analysis. To answer the 
research questions of this study, analysis of formal 
interviews on defendant decision-making included 
responses to the following questions: Why did you accept 
a plea of guilty instead of pursue a trial?; What factors 
did you consider when you were making the decision to 
plead guilty?; Did you originally intend or want to plead 
guilty?; and, Did you understand the plea-bargaining 
process and the outcome? All responses are coded into one 
of three themes, following the theoretical literature on 
plea bargain decision-making—Efficiency, Uncertainty 
Avoidance, and Blameworthiness. Analysis of perceptions 
of justice included responses to the following questions: 
Do you think that the outcome of your case was fair?; Do 
you think that the procedures were fair?; Were you 
satisfied with the use of plea bargaining in your case?; 
Did you feel as if you had the ability to participate in the 
decisions made in your case?; Did you feel that you had a 
                                               
42 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); CASPER, 
supra note 24, at 90–91.  
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voice, and that you were listened to?; Do you feel that you 
were respected?; Did you feel as if your lawyer wanted 
you to plead guilty?; Did you feel that your lawyer was on 
your side?; and, Did you feel that your lawyer was fair to 
you? 
 In the following pages, we first present findings 
on why defendants decide to plead guilty and then 
consider perceptions of the plea outcome and process. 
Because data was collected across varying levels of case 
severity, we consider how perceptions differ among 
individuals charged with felonies and less serious 
charges. Past research has not considered how both 
defendant characteristics and case severity interact with 
and influence differences in court experiences; however, 
it is possible that defendants who face more severe 
sanctions, including imprisonment, loss of employment, 
and loss of housing, may be more concerned with the 
outcomes of their case and inclined to more actively 
participate in the procedures and decisions made in their 
case. In contrast, defendants who are confronted with 
less severe sanctions may articulate less concern with the 
procedures and outcomes of their case and, therefore, not 
be as inclined to participate in their case. It is also likely 
that defendants who are solely charged with 
misdemeanors have fewer opportunities to participate in 
the procedures of their case. Because misdemeanor 
courtrooms often have many cases to consider in a 
relatively short amount of time, attorney-client 
interactions are quick and succinct.  
 
VIII. Results 
 
The characteristics of all Hennepin County 
defendants, defendants who received legal services 
through the public defender’s office, and the defendants 
interviewed for this study are reported in Table 1. 
Similar to courts across the U.S., Hennepin County 
defendants are disproportionately poor, young, and male. 
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Black defendants represent thirty percent of the total 
population but fifty percent of defendants who received 
legal services through the public defender’s office. Over 
sixty percent of both the total sample and the defendants 
who received legal services through the public defender’s 
office were charged with a misdemeanor offense—an 
offense that carries a sentence of up to a maximum of 
ninety days in jail and/or a $1000 fine. The demographics 
of defendants interviewed for this study are 
representative of those who received legal service 
through the public defender’s office; however, defendants 
charged with a felony are overrepresented compared to 
the number of felony cases represented by public 
defenders (sixty percent and seventeen percent, 
respectively). All defendants who were interviewed for 
this study and who were convicted and sentenced 
accepted an offer to plead guilty. Six defendants 
interviewed had their case dismissed, but five out of the 
six attended several court dates and entertained plea 
offers until their cases were dismissed. 
 
Table 1. Selected Characteristics of Defendants (D’s) in Hennepin 
County, the Public Defender’s Office, and the Interview Sample 
(2009, Most Serious Charge Per Case) 
 Defendants 
of Hennepin 
County 
Defendants of the 
Public Defender’s 
Office 
Defendants in 
the Interview  
Sample 
Total  59,484    21,848 40 
 n % n % n % 
Gender       
Male 42,382 71 16,494 75 31 77 
Female 15,060 25 5,073 24 9 23 
Missing 2,042 4 281 1 -- -- 
Race       
White 18,204 31 5,180 24 13 33 
Black 21,866 37 11,013 50 24 60 
Hispanic 2,836 5 1,131 5 -- -- 
Other2 16,578 27 4,524 21 3 7 
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Age 
< 18 171 <1 20 <1 -- -- 
18-25 18,600 31 7,781 36 14 36 
26-35 17,576 29 6,026 27 9 22 
36-45 11,680 20 4,297 20 9 22 
46-55 8,406 14 3,054 14 8 20 
> 56 3,051 5 670 3 -- -- 
Charge       
Felony 5,229 9 3,794 17 24 60 
Gross 
Misdemeanor 
 
6,257 11 2,813 13 2 5 
Misdemeanor 38,748 65 15,032 69 14 35 
Petty 
Misdemeanor 
 
9,250 15 209 1 -- -- 
Offense       
Homicide 44 <1 31 <1 -- -- 
Assault 4,400 7 2,852 13 3 8 
Domestic 706 1 509 2 4 10 
Sex Offense 481 <1 304 1 2 5 
Weapons 606 1 432 2 0 -- 
Drugs 1,463 2 831 4 4 10 
Property 2,607 4 1,785 9 16 40 
Alcohol 
 
7,979 13 2,552 12 1 2 
Conduct3 
 
15,317 26 8,058 37 3 8 
Traffic 24,797 42 4,222 19 7 17 
Other4 1,084 2 272 1 -- -- 
Legal 
Represent-
ation 
 
      
Free, 
Appointed 
Counsel 
 
21,848 37 21,848 100 40 10
0 
Private 
Attorney 
 
11,720 20 -- -- -- -- 
None 25,916 43 -- -- -- -- 
Disposition       
Dismissed5 29,081 49 12,185 56 6 15 
Convicted 15,567 26 6,238 29 14 35 
23
Hussemann and Siegel: Pleading Guilty
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2019
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2 
 
[482] 
1 Data obtained from Hennepin County Research Division; Data 
contains all adult criminal cases filed; Data includes only one 
charge per criminal case. 
2 Includes Native American (3%), Asian (2%), Hawaiian (<1%), and 
defendants whose race is missing. 
3 Includes defendants charged with disorderly conduct, trespassing, 
loitering, solicitation, obstructing justice, etc.  
4 Includes defendants charged with land, housing, boating, animal 
violations, etc.  
5 Includes cases that were dismissed for mental incompetence (<1%) 
and cases that were acquitted (<1%). 
6 A stay of imposition (SOI) or stay of execution occurs when an 
imposition is pronounced but delayed to a further date. If the offender 
complies with the conditions of the court, a felony conviction will be 
reduced to a misdemeanor conviction. If the offender fails to comply 
with the conditions of the court, the court may hold a hearing and 
impose/execute the sentence.  
7 Includes cases with a disposition of stay of adjudication (SOA) or 
continued without prosecution (CWOP). SOAs and CWOPs occur 
when a defendant pleads guilty and the case is continued for 
dismissal. SOAs and CWOPs do not result in a conviction unless the 
defendant violates conditions of the court. SOAs and CWOPs include 
cases that are diverted through probation and/or diversion programs. 
 
A. Deciding to Plead Guilty—Efficiency, 
Avoiding Uncertainty, and Blameworthiness 
 
 Table 2 presents the proportion of defendants who 
pled guilty for reasons associated with efficiency, 
avoiding uncertainty, and blameworthiness. The smallest 
proportion of defendants (11 percent) indicated that they 
pled guilty because they committed the crime and felt 
that they needed to take responsibility for their 
behaviors. The largest proportion (50 percent) of 
defendants indicated that they pled guilty because of the 
efficiency offered by the plea process. The second largest 
group of defendants (38 percent) indicated that they pled 
Stay of 
Imposition6 
2,187 3 978 4 6 15 
Continued7 12,621 21 2,428 11 14 35 
Missing 28 <1 19 <1 -- -- 
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guilty because they did not want to risk taking their case 
to trial and receiving a more severe sentence.  
 
Table 2. Defendant Decisions to Plead Guilty* 
 
Blame-
worthiness Efficiency 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
 n % n % n % 
Total 4 11.7 17 50.0 13 38.3 
Gender       
   Male 2 8.0 13 52.0 10 40.0 
   Female 2 22.0 4 44.6 3 33.4 
Race       
   White 2 15.4 6 46.1 5 38.5 
   Black 2 10.5 10 52.6 7 36.9 
   Other -- -- 1 50.0 1 50.0 
Charge       
Misdemeanor 
and Gross 1 9.0 7 63.6 3 27.2 
   Felony 3 13.0 10 43.5 10 43.5 
Priors       
   Yes 2 8.0 13 52.0 10 40.0 
   No 2 22.2 4 44.5 3 33.3 
In Custody       
   Yes -- -- 2 33.3 4 66.7 
   No 4 14.3 15 53.6 9 32.1 
* Results do not include those defendants whose case was dismissed 
(N = 6) 
 
 Black and white defendants, and those with and 
without prior convictions, indicated that they pled guilty 
because of the time and money savings associated with 
accepting a plea deal. Two-thirds of defendants who were 
facing a less severe charge than a felony pled to “get it 
over with,” and half of those charged with a felony made 
the same decision. The finding that individuals charged 
with a felony enter pleas of guilty because of the 
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efficiency offered by the plea process is somewhat 
surprising. Research in the lower courts indicates that 
defendants who are charged with misdemeanors are most 
concerned about how quickly the case can be resolved, 
versus the outcome of the case.43 For individuals who are 
charged with more severe offenses, we often assume that 
there will be an increased concern with the procedures 
and outcome of the case, versus the efficiency of the 
process. Our finding, however, indicates that individuals 
who are charged with a felony are not dissimilar from 
individuals who are charged with less severe offenses 
when making decisions about whether to enter a plea of 
guilty.  
 Over half of the individuals who indicated that 
they accepted a plea of guilty for reasons associated with 
efficiency and uncertainty avoidance were incarcerated 
pretrial. This finding is supported by prior research on 
the impact of pretrial custody which indicates that 
prosecutorial offers to “get out of jail” typically trumps 
defendants’ interest in pursuing a trial because of the 
time required to take a case to trial and the risks 
associated.44 This finding is articulated through the 
following statements made by defendants:  
 
Personally, I would just go with whatever 
they give me so I can hurry up and get out 
of there. I just went on and told them yep, 
yep, whatever, anything as long as it’s 
going to get me out of here. (male, black, 
felony) 
 
                                               
43 FEELEY, supra note 3.  
44 Albert A. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 61–62 (1968); Bowers, supra 
note 22, at 1133; FEELEY, supra note 3; Gerard E. Lynch, Our 
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2146 (1998).  
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Nah, I ain’t taking nothing to trial. Plead, 
give them what they want, get out. A lot of 
people can’t take it to trial because they got 
family shit at home. (male, black, felony) 
 
While the majority of defendants articulated support for 
an efficiency perspective of decision-making, how they 
arrived at their final decision was nuanced and 
contextualized by considerations of guilt and risk. 
Defendants indicated that they decided not to take their 
case to trial because it would require too much time and 
money. However, this decision was often juxtaposed by 
defendants stating that they were guilty—so why fight 
it?—or that they did not want to risk the outcome of a 
trial—so why spend the time on taking it to trial?  
 
It’s too emotionally and physically 
draining for somebody to have to go 
through that [trial].  And then, you know, 
that means I have to take more time off 
work, more time finding someone to watch 
my kids, more time to do this.  It’s just not 
worth it overall.  I’ll take my responsibility. 
I'm in trouble, I’ll take my year of 
probation, I’ll do my fines and then it’s 
done. It just seemed like an easier way to 
go. Less fines. No jail time . . . I know I did 
something wrong. (female, white, 
misdemeanor) 
 
They was offering me six years, you know 
what I’m saying, so I fought it.  I fought it 
for like four and a half months.  I’m sitting 
down in the county [jail] just fighting it.  
Like no way, I’m not taking this.  I didn’t 
do nothing and I shouldn’t even be here.  
But, like the deals are getting worse and 
worse and worse.  They first offered me 48 
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months and then they went to 52 and then 
they went to 57, so they kept climbing the 
deals…No I didn’t take it to trial because 
they said if I don’t take it to trial they’ll just 
give me four more months.  Just do four 
more months because I already did four 
more months.  So they made it seem so 
sweet to me, but it hurt me in the long run, 
you know, because I’ve never been in jail 
before.  So I’m panicking, I’m in jail for four 
months and I’m like oh my goodness seems 
like I’ve been gone for like two years just 
sitting in a little cage, cell by yourself is 
crazy.  I’ve never been in that position so I’m 
like freaking out.  I wanted to take it to 
trial, but I just couldn’t handle the jail, you 
know, and what if I did lose because, you 
know, I don’t know.  I would never want to 
use it as an excuse, but you know I just felt 
that I might have lost.  If I would have lost, 
I would have been sitting in prison for six 
years. (male, black, felony) 
 
B. Deciding to Plead Guilty—
Misunderstanding and Fear 
 
 While theories of efficiency, uncertainty 
avoidance, and blameworthiness are associated with 
defendants’ decisions to plead guilty, the most commonly 
articulated factors that mediated decisions to accept a 
plea of guilty were misunderstanding and fear. The 
observational and interview findings of this study 
suggest that defendants do not understand the charges 
to which they are pleading guilty, the sentence, and the 
consequences of entering a plea of guilty. Stemming from 
misunderstandings about the plea process and the legal 
language associated with plea bargains, defendants 
entered pleas of guilty to exit a situation that they do not 
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understand and have little control over.  
 
I believe like at court when they brought it 
up it was kind of like a deal saying that I 
would have been on probation for two 
years—felony probation. And you know, I 
do kind of have a little experience with 
court . . . but not really as an adult.  So I 
didn’t really know what was going to 
happen. And I . . . you know I really didn’t 
want to go through that whole process so I 
took the first thing that was handed to me.  
And that’s kind of what got me in this 
situation . . . well not exactly this situation 
but got me on probation. But you know I 
really don’t, you know. And . . . ah . . . yeah, 
I just feel like the decisions that was made 
was a part of me being tired of dealing with 
things, and not understanding what was 
going on. . . . I just felt like I didn’t want to 
deal with it. (male, black, felony) 
 
Particularly when it’s your first time in 
there, it’s scary.  Everything is moving 
quickly.  A lot of people they talk like they 
get very frustrated by that and they get 
more scared because they have no idea 
what’s going on, and then you’re asked to 
make pretty quick decisions. And most 
people like me myself personally I would 
just go with whatever they give me so I can 
hurry up and get out of there. Sometimes I 
just agree just to get out of jail or to get out 
of the court room.  Like the day we were 
there for the pre-trial [conference] I was 
already ready to take whatever they were 
going to give me. (male, black, 
misdemeanor) 
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I don’t even want to risk it.  I’m not too—I 
don’t know too much about the system or 
the law or too much about that.  I never 
really had to deal with it like that.  So 
taking them to court, I think it would be a 
waste of time because I don’t get it. I’ll just 
move on. (male, black, misdemeanor)  
 
Defendants often considered not accepting a plea of guilty 
and taking their case to trial, but out of fear, ended up 
accepting a plea of guilty. This finding is particularly 
relevant as scholarly interest in wrongful convictions in 
the U.S. has garnered increasing attention over the past 
decade due in large part to a growing public awareness of 
wrongful convictions, and the increasing number of 
individuals whose sentences are vacated because they 
were convicted of a crime that they did not commit. Since 
1989, more than 2,100 people have had their sentences 
vacated.45 In 2017 alone, more than 130 individuals were 
identified as convicted for a crime that they did not 
commit.46 Although estimates of the rate of wrongful 
convictions vary, and typically focus on capital charges 
and cases in which charges have been vacated, 
observational and interview data collected in this study 
suggest that defendants who are charged with 
misdemeanor and felony offenses and whom claim 
innocence do plead guilty.  
 
I took a plea agreement without even 
knowing what I was going to get.  Like not 
                                               
45 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, UNIV. OF CAL. IRVINE, 
EXONERATIONS IN 2017, at 3(2017).  
46 Id. This number does not include approximately 96 
individuals whose drug-related convictions were found to be 
the result of systematic framing on the part of police officers in 
Baltimore and Chicago. Id. at 1. At the time of publication, 176 
sentences have been vacated and more are expected to occur in 
2018. 
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even a full understanding, I just, I don’t 
know.  Like my public defender wanted me 
to keep the plea as not guilty.  Like he told 
me that a couple times and like I just 
wanted out.  I’d rather, I guess I’d rather 
have my plea as not guilty if I could have 
stayed out and gone to trial.  If I knew I was 
going to be out then I pled not guilty 
because I don’t think they could have 
proved beyond reasonable doubt that I did 
this because there was no evidence—there 
is absolutely nothing . . . . Obviously, I 
think I would win, but the whole “what if I 
don’t.”  What if I don’t, then I’m dead. 
Because I’ve never been through the courts 
before.  I’ve never been to the jail before, so 
I didn’t know anything.  I had no idea what 
was going on, like I’m just sitting there not 
knowing if I’m going to get out and not 
knowing if I needed to see the judge or what 
was going on. And so, then that’s when I’m 
just like well I just want to take the plea.  I 
just want to get out of here.  I guess there 
was another plea and I didn’t understand 
the other one. I guess like I know that’s not 
why, like you’re not supposed to take a plea 
to get out of jail.  Like you can’t do it I guess, 
but I would say that’s pretty much what I 
did just because I wanted it done with—so 
I could move on. I guess I just kind of 
misunderstood. (male, white, 
misdemeanor) 
 
I didn’t want to take the plea.  I said, “No.  
I don’t want to.”  But now when it gets all 
the way to this point and I got out and I got 
all my jobs back.  Fuck it.  Now I got out I 
might as well take it and get it over with. 
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When I was in jail I said, let’s do something 
right now.  But no.  Nobody wanted to do 
nothing.  But they gave me this opportunity 
to get out and . . . I don’t want to take it to 
trial now. (female, black, felony) 
 
C. Perceptions of the Plea Outcome as Fair 
 
Given the findings associated with defendant 
decisions to accept a plea of guilty, it is compelling to 
consider whether defendants perceive the outcomes and 
procedures of their case as fair. Table 3 provides 
information on the association between defendant 
characteristics and the indicators of procedural fairness, 
outcome fairness, and case participation. Over 60 percent 
of defendants interviewed for this study expressed 
positive perceptions of the procedures and outcomes of 
their case while 72 percent expressed negative 
perceptions of their ability to participate in their case. 
Defendants charged with both felony and lesser charges 
articulated positive perceptions of the plea process (62 
percent) and outcome (62 percent and 81 percent, 
respectively). Those individuals whose cases were 
dismissed overwhelmingly agreed that the court process 
and outcome was fair (100 percent); only one defendant 
whose case was dismissed felt that he did not have input 
in the process. Defendants who received a disposition 
other than dismissal were still most likely to express 
positive perceptions of the plea process (between 50 and 
64 percent), but overwhelmingly expressed concern about 
their ability to participate in the procedures and 
outcomes of their case (between 66 and 92 percent). 
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Table 3. Defendant Perceptions of Plea Bargaining 
 Process is Fair Outcome is Fair Participation 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Total 27 
(67.5%) 
13 
(32.5%) 
28 
(70.0%) 
12 
(30.0%) 
11 
(27.5%) 
29 
(72.5%) 
Gender       
   Male 23 
(74.2%) 
8 
(25.8%) 
24 
(77.4%) 
7 
(22.6%) 
 
11 
(35.5%) 
20 
(64.5%) 
   Female 4 
(44.4%) 
5 
(55.6%) 
4 
(44.4%) 
5 
(55.6%) 
-- 
-- 
9 
(100.0%) 
Race       
   White 9 
(69.2%) 
4 
(30.8%) 
8 
(61.5%) 
5 
(38.5%) 
2 
(15.4%) 
11 
(84.6%) 
   African 
American 
16 
(66.7%) 
8 
(33.3%) 
18 
(75.0%) 
6 
(25.0%) 
8 
(33.3%) 
16 
(66.7%) 
   Other 2 
(66.7%) 
1 
(33.3%) 
2 
(66.7%) 
1 
(33.3%) 
1 
(33.3%) 
2 
(66.7%) 
Charge       
Mis-
demeanor 
and Gross 
 
10 
(62.5%) 
6 
(37.5%) 
13 
(81.3%) 
3 
(18.7%) 
7 
(43.7%) 
9 
(56.3%) 
   Felony 17 
(62.5%) 
7 
(37.5%) 
15 
(62.5%) 
9 
(37.5%) 
4 
(16.7%) 
20 
(83.3%) 
Dis-
position 
      
   
Dismissed 
 
6 
(100.0%) 
 
-- 
-- 
 
6 
(100.0%) 
 
-- 
-- 
 
5 
(83.3%) 
 
1 
(16.7%) 
 
   Convicted  
9 
(64.2%) 
 
5 
(35.7%) 
 
10 
(71.4%) 
 
4 
(28.6%) 
 
3 
(20.0%) 
 
 
9 
(80.0%) 
Stay of Im-
position 
3 
(50.0%) 
3 
(50.0%) 
3 
(50.0%) 
3 
(50.0%) 
2 
(33.3%) 
 
4 
(66.7%) 
   Continued  
9 
(64.2%) 
 
5 
(37.5%) 
 
9 
(64.2%) 
 
5 
(35.8%) 
 
1 
(7.1%) 
 
13 
(92.9%) 
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Table 4. Defendant Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, by Process, 
Outcome, and Participation 
  
Process is 
Fair 
Outcome is 
Fair Participation 
  Yes No Yes No Yes No  
Total  27 
(67.5
%) 
13 
(32.5%
) 
28 
(70.0
%) 
12 
(30.0
%) 
11 
(27.5%
) 
29 
(72.5
%) 
        
Procedure is 
Fair 
Y  -- -- 25 
(89.3
%) 
2 
(16.7
%) 
11 
(100.0
%) 
16 
(55.2
%) 
 
 N -- -- 3 
(10.7
%) 
10 
(83.3
%) 
0 13 
(44.8
%) 
        
Outcome is 
Fair 
Y 25 
(92.5
%) 
3 
(23.0%
) 
-- -- 11 
(100.0
%) 
17 
(58.6
%) 
 
 N 2 
(7.5%
) 
10 
(77.0%
) 
-- -- -- 12 
(41.4
%) 
        
Participation Y  11 
(40.7
%) 
0 11 
(39.3
%) 
 
0 -- -- 
 N 16 
(59.3
%) 
13 
(100.0
%) 
17 
(60.7
%) 
12 
(100
%) 
-- -- 
 
The two factors that were most strongly 
associated with defendant perceptions of outcome 
fairness was the belief that the outcome received was a 
“good break” or that the outcome was “deserved.” This 
result supports our finding that defendants weigh 
considerations of blameworthiness and uncertainty 
avoidance when deciding to accept a plea of guilty. It is 
also supported by theories of distributive justice and 
prior research on outcome satisfaction. For example, 
Casper found that the majority of male defendants 
describe their sentence as fair, and that perceptions of 
outcome fairness was based on the belief that the 
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sentence receives was less severe than was anticipated—
or at least the “going rate”—and appropriate to the 
crime.47 Defendants interviewed for this study 
articulated similar perceptions:  
 
Yeah, I’m happy with the outcome. I was 
really happy. I was hoping for what I was 
offered, so I pretty much got what I was 
expecting. (female, white, felony) 
 
I thought that that they were going to put 
me on some type of probation for a certain 
amount of time where I would have to keep 
coming back to my probation officer. A lot 
of other things like that, you know, for like 
six months or something, and I won’t be 
able to get my driver’s license until I’m 21 
or something, that’s what I thought was 
going to happen. You know, so it was much 
of a relief when they said—when she said 
she might be able to switch it over to a 
disorderly conduct. Since I had already 
been in jail for two days and the police 
officer maced me, I have had enough 
punishment I guess. So I was really 
relieved when that happened. I’m glad I 
didn’t have to pay no ticket. That would 
have been even worse. . . . At the end of the 
day I’m happy with my outcome, yeah. 
(male, black, misdemeanor) 
 
 Defendants—both those who were interviewed 
and those whose cases were observed—who openly 
discussed their guilt perceived the plea process as a 
means to obtain an outcome that they felt they deserved. 
In this sense, defendants who indicated satisfaction with 
                                               
47 Casper, supra note 13.  
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their outcome adopted a just deserts approach to their 
outcome.48 As one defendant put it, “you do the crime, you 
do the time.” Another defendant charged with three 
felony counts of theft stated that he was “happy” with his 
court experience: 
 
Because of the outcomes that I received . . . 
I face consequences for what I did and if I 
wouldn’t have faced anything, if they had 
just said, “Okay you can go on with your 
business. Don’t ever do that again,” I never 
would have learned from my mistakes. So I 
believe that justice was served in my case. I 
deserved my consequences. I have to take 
part in what I did, pay for what I did. 
(male, white, felony) 
 
 Particularly in DWI and property cases where 
evidence is easily obtained through breathalyzers, blood 
tests, video surveillance, and fingerprinting, the question 
that loomed over defendants was not whether they would 
take their case to trial to dispute guilt, but what plea offer 
they would receive from the prosecutor.  One defendant 
who was ultimately convicted of felony check fraud 
recounts, “Basically the deal that I got—there’s no other 
better way that you could have ever put it, you know 
what I mean? I didn’t have to go to jail and got the same 
probation officer. To be honest with you, I probably 
should have gotten a little bit worse punishment than I 
did considering the fact of what I did.” 
 
 
                                               
48 See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS (1993); 
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS 
AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1987); 
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF 
INCARCERATION, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 
(1976). 
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D. Perceptions of the Plea Process as Fair 
 
 Over 90 percent of the defendants who were 
interviewed for this study and who perceived their 
outcome as fair also perceived the court process leading 
to their outcome as fair. A defining measure of procedural 
fairness in this study was whether defendants felt that 
they were treated the same as other defendants, and 
whether they felt fairly treated by the public defender—
conclusions arrived at by observing other cases and 
talking to other indigent defendants. In most cases, the 
considerable amount of waiting time required for a 
defendant’s case to be called allows plenty of 
opportunities to talk and mingle with other indigent 
defendants in hallways, elevators, and smoking areas. 
These interactions offer defendants a way to “blow off 
steam” and “kill time,” but it also provides them with 
information about others’ experiences, which they use to 
assess their own situation. As one defendant stated after 
stepping out of court, “They treat everyone the same, so 
yeah, I would consider it fair, or fair enough.” 
 For this same reason, however, some defendants 
perceive their treatment as unfair. In these cases, 
defendants articulated concern that their case was being 
handled the same as all other cases and not given 
individual consideration. Defendants expressed concern 
that they never had a conversation with their public 
defender before pleading guilty and did not understand 
the plea process that resulted in their outcome. One 
defendant who was charged with a felony count of 
property theft indicated that he was satisfied with his 
outcome but dissatisfied with the process:  
 
No, I don’t feel that I was treated fairly 
going through the process, but, I mean, 
what choice did I have. . . . He [the public 
defender] never communicated with me. 
Maybe he did do something, but I don’t 
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know what he did. He never told me 
anything. I was on my own. He said, “here 
is what’s going to happen. This is your case, 
so you go over here, go over there. Now you 
just come back and go see the judge and 
you’re on your way.” You know, and I’m like 
“okay.” But, I mean, yes, I am happy with 
the outcome. (male, black, felony) 
 
 This statement illustrates the frustration that 
many defendants articulated about their public defender, 
and how perception of public defenders’ behaviors can 
influence defendant perceptions of fairness. Legal 
scholars identify different and often competing 
conceptions of the role of criminal defense lawyers; 
however, most agree that zealous advocacy of defendants 
is necessary and justified.49 The American Bar 
Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
states that it is a lawyer’s responsibility to “represent a 
client zealously within the bounds of the law.”50  For 
indigent defendants, perceptions of enthusiastic and 
effective representation influence positive and negative 
judgments of public defenders. Those who perceived their 
public defender as an individual who is willing to fight 
for their case—i.e., put time and effort into the case—
were most likely to talk positively about public defenders 
                                               
49 THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 158; Abbe 
Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life 
and Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1209–10 (2004); Margareth Etienne, 
Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making 
Defendants Pay for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
2103, 2104–05 (2003); Charles J. Ogletree Jr., An Essay on the 
New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 81, 92 (1995); Charles J. Ogletree Jr., Beyond 
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public 
Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1242 (1993). 
50 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 1998). 
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and feel as if they were fairly treated. As one incarcerated 
black male stated, “I felt like she was great. She did 
everything in her power, everything that she could 
possibly do to give me the lesser charge possible or try to 
get me out of it. She did everything that she could do. So 
I felt she did her job really well.” Another white male 
charged with felony theft stated: 
 
Oh, I liked my public defender, she’s a great 
attorney and I really appreciated her help. 
I feel like she did a better job than other 
public defenders I’ve ever had. It just 
seemed like she had an actual knowledge of 
the case, like she actually paid attention to 
it. Most public defenders don’t even know 
who you are until they look in your file 
when they see you. She seemed like she 
actually, you know, took the time and tried 
to find out the best results and get 
information. So, yeah, I was real 
appreciative. I liked her, she was a good 
person. (white, male, felony) 
 
 Defendants who perceived their public defender 
as an individual who was not willing to fight for their case 
were less likely to speak positively about their experience 
with their legal representation and their court 
experience: 
 
Personally, to me, I want to have my own 
lawyer next time. Pay my own lawyer, 
‘cause I know if I got my own lawyer that 
he’s gonna fight for me. The public defender 
is not gonna fight for you. (black, male, 
felony)  
 
I think it’s just not fair, like the public 
defenders are bullshit. Like you can call a 
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real lawyer and he can get you less time, 
but call a public defender and he can get 
you the most time, you know what I’m 
saying? Like if a public defender is 
supposed to be a lawyer, right? So how 
come they can’t act like the lawyer? It’s like 
bullshit, you know. They’re supposed to try 
their hardest. I bet you if somebody was 
paying them, then they will try to go 
harder, know what I mean? A lot of them 
don’t care. They don’t care because they got 
so many cases. They get paid for so many 
cases, so they pretty much want to get you 
in and get you out of their face. (black, 
male, felony) 
 
 Research shows that the most common complaint 
received by public defenders concerns the lack of time 
and attention they give to defendants.51  Professional 
conduct rules require that public defenders keep clients 
informed of the status of their case and promptly respond 
to client requests for information.52 The reality, however, 
is that public defenders are often unable to comply with 
professional duties because of circumstances that include 
excessive caseloads and a failure to be appointed to a case 
in a timely manner.53  When public defenders have too 
                                               
51 Christopher Campbell et al., Unnoticed, Untapped, and 
Underappreciated: Clients’ Perceptions of Their Public 
Defenders, 33 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751, 758–66 (2015); ROY B. 
FLEMMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK 
IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES (1992); cf. THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 2, at 95 (discussing the 
inability of indigent defense attorneys to comply with their 
professional duties due to, among other things, excessive 
caseloads). 
52 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 1998). 
53 BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 22; THE CONSTITUTION 
PROJECT, supra note 2, at 95. 
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many cases, client contact suffers and sometimes 
becomes virtually non-existent. Defenders become 
unavailable to defendants because they are constantly in 
court, which often forces initial public defender-
defendant meetings to take place in the courtroom.  
 
Yeah, like the only reason that I would not 
have him to be my lawyer again is basically 
because of the miscommunication that we 
had. It’s not something that he did with my 
case wrong or anything. It’s just that I feel 
like if I call, if I call you two or three times 
a week and you don’t return any of my calls 
or give me any type of response, something’s 
wrong with that. Either you’re just ignoring 
me or you don’t really care about what’s 
going on with my case. You just want to get 
it over with. And, you know, he has a lot of 
other clients too, but that’s no reason. With 
Monday through Friday, there’s no reason 
that out of those days that I can’t get a 
response from you from calling you two or 
three times a week. (white, male, felony) 
 
The hardest part is getting a hold of the 
public defender. I was trying to get a hold 
of the public defender, but they never call 
you back or talk with you or anything like 
that. So until your date, your next court 
date—that’s the first time I talked with my 
public defender. And all they do is come out 
and ask for a new court date because they 
haven’t had a chance to look over the case 
at all. (white, male, felony)  
 
He talked with me one time and he told me 
the offer, that’s it. (black, male, felony)  
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I wasn’t treated fairly because being treated 
fairly is when you’re honest with your client 
and you put everything on the table and let 
them know what’s going on. (black, female, 
felony) 
 
 Research by Tom Tyler and colleagues suggests 
that defendants are most likely to report positive 
perceptions of court actors if they understand what 
motivates their behavior and decision-making.54  
Authorities who act unexpectedly are not necessarily 
judged to be untrustworthy if people feel that they 
understand why they behave in the manner in which 
they do. Conversations with the defendants in this study 
confirm this finding. As articulated in the previous 
statements, defendants critique public defenders but also 
provide justification for their behaviors. For example, one 
black male who received a stayed sentence for a series of 
misdemeanor violations indicated that he was 
disappointed in his lawyer’s willingness to fight for a 
better plea negotiation—“He was alright, but he could 
have tugged a little harder to get it down a little more.” 
The defendant followed this statement with the following 
explanation for the defender’s behavior:   
 
He was pressed for time ‘cause he got to be 
here, he got to be there. You can’t get mad 
at them because they are overloaded. You 
know, if you want to keep it real, they are 
all public defenders, pretenders, or 
whatever. They are all overloaded. They get 
                                               
54 TYLER, supra note 42; Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural 
Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of 
Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 129 (1998); Tyler, 
supra note 25, at 70; Tom Tyler & Robert J. Bies, Beyond 
Formal Procedures: The Interpersonal Context of Procedural 
Justice, in APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
SETTINGS 78 (John S. Carroll ed., 1990). 
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more and more every day. You know it’s a 
wonder that all of them ain’t half crazy. It’s 
not good. It’s not good. It’s not good. But, 
that’s basically what it is, you know. It’s 
bad because you—you ain’t have no faith in 
the system, you know, ‘cause you ain’t got 
nobody that’s gonna really fight for you. 
Half of them can’t even negotiate on a plea 
bargain, let alone on a trial. I guess that’s 
probably even how they are taught in 
college now-a-days, just to be a deal-maker. 
(male, black, misdemeanor) 
 
 Another white female who received probation for 
a misdemeanor indicated that she was concerned during 
court because she expected to have more opportunities to 
talk with her attorney, but also indicated that “there are 
so many other cases and horrible things that happen, 
that they can’t worry about [her].” Also, a black male who 
was incarcerated for multiple misdemeanors stated, 
 
Those public defenders, you can’t even talk 
to them.  It’s frustrating.  You know that it’s 
six or seven other people to this one person.  
I mean like how many people can you 
actually juggle by yourself?  I thought 
public defenders were supposed to be there 
to help so why isn’t there more of them? 
(male, black, misdemeanor) 
  
 Previous research indicates that defendants 
express sentiments of distrust for public defenders.55 The 
findings of this research, however, indicate that 
defendants are not necessarily distrusting of public 
defenders, but of the system that public defenders work 
                                               
55 CASPER, supra note 24; Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a 
Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public Defender, 
1 YALE REV. LAW SOC. ACTION 4, 6 (1971).  
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for. Public defenders are perceived by defendants as part 
of a larger system that prescribes their behavior.  
 
I do not really feel like he was on my side.  
I’ll be honest with you.  Not really.  I'm just 
another, you know, pawn on the 
chessboard.  He's just doing his job.  Just 
get ‘em in, get ‘em out, get ‘em in, get ‘em 
out, you know? It’s just a job with the 
prosecutor. (male, black, misdemeanor) 
 
When you’re incarcerated they call them 
“public pretenders.” But, you know, it’s the 
truth because you know the prosecutors and 
the public defenders they eat lunch 
together, they go fishing together, you know 
they just hang out together, they’re friends.  
You know, so while they’re like eating 
ravioli, it’s probably like, “Oh what do you 
want to do with him?  Okay I’ll give you 
him, just let me beat this case right here.” 
You know what I’m saying?  It’s like chess 
and it’s kind of messed up. (male, black, 
felony)  
 
It’s not fair because they work for the city. 
So, he started working with the prosecutors 
and seeing what they want to come up with, 
but he’s not asking the client what’s going 
on. It’s not fair. It was all him, him and the 
prosecutor. The public defender is not fair; 
it’s not justice because they do what they 
want to do. What them and the prosecutor 
want to do. (male, black, felony)  
 
 Statements such as these suggest that defendants 
do not necessarily view the behavior of public defenders 
as representative of the defenders themselves, but rather 
as a reflection of the circumstances of their position in the 
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criminal courts, which relies heavily on the plea process 
to ensure efficient case progress. Defendants did not 
perceive public defenders as apathetic but overextended. 
This account of the plea process parallels criticisms 
among scholars who argue that the criminal process has 
evolved into a system of assembly line justice which is 
most concerned with processing cases as quickly and 
efficiently as possible.56 For these reasons, many 
defendants are not provided with contact information for 
their public defenders and, if they are, are not able to 
reach the public defender or receive a return phone call. 
A defendant who was charged with driving with a 
cancelled license for the fifth time explained this 
experience: 
 
Yeah, you know, it’s just like a process, like 
a processing plant. They just process you, 
like they processing cattle. They say, “Okay 
this is what they gonna do for you: so, so, 
so, so. Now if you don’t do this here, now the 
charge carries: so, so, so, so.  Now I can get 
you this here. Right now, today, I can get 
you so, so, so, and then you go to jail.” You 
                                               
56 BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2; William Glaberson, Faltering 
Courts, Mired in Delays, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/nyregion/justice-denied-
bronx-court-system-mired-in-delays.html 
[https://perma.cc/H3XX-FLA5]; William Galberson, Courts in 
Slow Motion, Aided by the Defense, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 14, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/nyregion/justice-denied-
courts-in-slow-motion-aided-by-defense.html 
[https://perma.cc/8W8T-A5NQ]; Ari Shapiro, Report Calls Out 
Flaws In Public Defender System, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, (Apr. 15, 
2009),https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
103108229 [https://perma.cc/3CQP-EBH6]; Cara Tabachnick, 
In the Public Defense, THE CRIME REPORT, (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://www.thecrimereport.org/archive/in-the-public-defense 
[https://perma.cc/GRQ8-5Z64]. 
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know, it’s just a process. You know, they 
don’t have time to deal with no one 
individual, ‘cause they can’t put too much 
time in ‘cause they got so many. Like I say, 
it’s like, “Come on down, you’re the first 
contestant in The Price is Right!” It’s like 
Monty Hall in Let’s Make a Deal. (male, 
black, misdemeanor) 
 
 As this defendant articulates, the plea process can 
move rapidly. On days in which the court calendar is 
full—such as after the weekend or a holiday—or, in 
courts that see a particularly high volume of cases—such 
as property and drug courts—cases can move so quickly 
that there is not time for the defendant to meet or talk to 
their public defender. In conversations with defendants 
after their first appearance, defendants were often 
unable to state the name of their public defender, or how 
they may be able to reach the defender. As one black male 
defendant charged with 5th degree drug possession 
articulates: 
 
The first time I went through it, I was 
terrified. I didn’t know what was going on. 
I felt like I was from Asia and it’s my third 
day here in America and I didn’t have no 
English classes or whatever, so I’m 
speaking a whole different language. And 
they’re just like talking a foreign language 
and I’m like, “What’s going on? I need to 
talk to my lawyer.”  I’m like, “but look I 
don’t understand, like, you know, hold up.” 
I just felt ignorant, you know what I mean. 
The first time, I’m like “oh my.”  I learned 
everything I know about the court system 
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being inside the jail and not from being in 
court, not from my lawyer, but by sitting 
there listening and watching other cases. 
(male, black, felony). 
 
E. Perceptions of Participation and Self-
Expression 
 
 Despite the finding that most defendants perceive 
the outcomes and procedures of their case as fair, over 70 
percent of defendants did not feel like that they had 
adequately participated in their cases. Table 3 indicates 
that over half of all defendants who reported that the 
process and outcome of their case was fair also indicated 
that they did not have enough input in their case. This 
finding is somewhat surprising. As cited previously, the 
extant literature on perceptions of fairness argue that 
when defendants feel as if they are a part of the 
procedures of their case and have adequate opportunities 
to voice their side of the story, positive attitudes of the 
fairness of the outcome and procedures of their case 
increase.57 Empirical studies that consider the plea 
process, however, provide contradictory accounts of the 
effect of participation in plea bargaining on perceptions 
of fairness. For example, some scholars argue that plea 
bargaining provides more control and a heightened sense 
of efficacy because defendants are actively participating 
in their case by pleading guilty in return for an agreed 
upon sentence.58  In this regard, the process of plea 
bargaining can provide defendants with greater certainty 
over their outcome, leading to more positive evaluations 
                                               
57 LIND & TYLER, supra note 27, at 9; THIBAUT & WALKER, supra 
note 29. 
58 Anne M. Heinz, Procedures Versus Consequences: 
Experimental Evidence of Preferences for Procedural and 
Distributive Justice, in COURTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
EMERGING JUSTICE (Susette M. Talarico, ed., 1985). 
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of their process. Casper argues that in cases when 
defendants receive an outcome that is not expected, they 
are more likely to articulate limited participation in their 
case and perceive the process as less fair.59 The findings 
of our research also indicate that defendants who were 
caught off-guard by the decisions of the court were more 
likely to express negative attitudes. One defendant 
charged with 2nd degree assault describes her experience 
of receiving a more severe sentence than she anticipated:  
 
No, we didn’t talk a lot. I left him [public 
defender] a few messages, spoke to him on 
the phone and asked him, you know 
different questions about where I was 
going. He said jail time was out of the 
picture. I knew for a fact that jail time 
wasn’t going to happen. I just knew that for 
a fact that it was no jail time. And then on 
the last day it’s jail time…it wasn’t an 
honest way to come and tell me I was doing 
jail time, to find out on the very last day 
when I go to court that I’m going to get 
sentenced to jail, and never heard it. Before 
any conversation that we had, any 
paperwork that I signed, he never said 
anything. So then I come to court and 
expect probation, monetary probation, 
strict probation, or whatever and then have 
to get locked up. I thought that was very 
unfair because that was the first time I 
heard of it before going into court. I just 
wished he would have talked to me more 
and prepared me a little bit more. When I 
                                               
59 CASPER, supra note 24. 
48
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 3
https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol13/iss2/3
PLEADING GUILTY 
13 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 459 (2019) 
 
[507] 
expected no jail time and then when I got 
jail time it was like, “oh well, you got jail 
time.” It was like “case closed” for him. Like 
I know he had to know ahead of time before 
five minutes before court. So, oh well, I just 
got to live with it and do my time I guess. I 
would have felt good if I would have had a 
chance to speak more and explain myself. 
Then I would have been prepared for this, 
but like I said, it all hit me like five minutes 
before we went to court, so I wasn’t really 
expecting that. And the judge, the judge 
just agreed to everything that was going on 
and did not take time to listen to my side. 
So, I guess I get the shit end of the stick. 
(female, white, felony) 
 
 In more serious felony cases, such as this one, 
defendants are less likely to be certain of the outcome of 
their plea agreement when they sign it. Unlike 
misdemeanor cases, in which most cases are settled on 
the first or second day in court, felony cases can be 
extended for over a year (as in this case), and often 
involve pre-plea agreements. In cases in which pre-pleas 
are signed, the defendants admit their guilt and consent 
to an interview and evaluation by probation that 
presumably guides the decision of the judge. In most 
cases, public defenders promote pre-plea evaluations as 
an opportunity to decrease defendant sentences because 
they offer the judge and other court members a more 
thorough understanding of the defendant’s history and 
the situation surrounding the case. However, defendants 
often become frustrated after reading these reports 
because they do not feel as if the probation officer 
adequately represents them—most articulated concern 
that the report contained negative information that was 
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not reported by the defendant, such as drug and alcohol 
use.  
 Differences in procedures between felony and 
misdemeanor cases may understandably influence the 
experience of defendants. Table 5 reports defendant 
perceptions of procedures, outcomes, and case 
participation by case severity. These results indicate that 
the most prevalent difference between individuals 
charged with felonies and less severe charges is the 
association that defendants draw between having a voice 
and fair procedures and outcomes. Individuals who are 
charged with felonies, compared to those who are charged 
with less severe offenses, are less likely to indicate that 
they adequately participated in their case (16 percent 
compared to 43 percent) and less likely to associate their 
participation with procedural and outcome fairness. Only 
23 percent of felony defendants agreed that they 
participated in procedures that they experienced as fair 
(compared to 70 percent of misdemeanor/gross 
misdemeanor defendants); 26 percent agreed that they 
had participated in outcomes they perceived as fair 
(compared to 53 percent of misdemeanor/gross 
misdemeanor defendants). Prior examinations of the 
relationship between case severity and court experiences 
suggests that case severity can influence defendants’ 
interest in their case, particularly when the outcomes are 
more severe.60 This research provides support for such 
claims. Defendants in this study who were charged with 
lower-level offenses were more likely to express apathy 
towards the procedures and outcome of their case. For 
example, when asked whether defendants would prefer 
more opportunities to be involved in their case, one 
Hispanic male charged with a misdemeanor count of 
contempt of court responded that the courts can “do what 
they want.” When we subsequently asked if he felt that 
he was treated with respect, he indicated that he “has 
never really thought about it.” Statements such as these 
                                               
60 Heinz, supra note 58. 
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by defendants support observed differences in 
misdemeanor and felony courts. Defendants in 
misdemeanor courts more frequently “blow-off” court 
dates. They plead guilty without talking with their public 
defender about options other than the original plea 
offered by the state. Defendants charged with 
misdemeanors are also more likely to arrive to court 
alone without family or friends, whereas in felony 
courtrooms, family members, friends, and caseworkers 
provide a regular show of support, concern, and input 
into defendant decision-making.   
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Table 5. Defendant Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, by 
Process, Outcome, Satisfaction, and Charge Level 
  Process is Fair 
  Outcome is  
         Fair 
   
Participation 
            Yes No Yes No Yes No  
Misdemean
or and 
Gross 
 10 
(62.5%) 
6 
(37.5%) 
13 
(81.3%) 
3 
(18.7%) 
7 
(43.7%) 
9 
(56.3%) 
        
Procedure is 
Fair 
Y -- -- 10 
(76.9%) 
0 7 
(100.0%) 
3 
(33.3%) 
 N -- -- 3 
(23.1%) 
3 
(100.0%
) 
0 6 
(66.7%) 
        
Outcome is 
Fair 
Y 10 
(100.0%) 
3 
(50.0%) 
-- -- 7 
(100.00%
) 
6 
(66.7%) 
 N 0 3 
(50.0%) 
-- -- 0 3 
(33.3%) 
        
Participation Y 7 
(70.0%) 
0 7 
(53.8%) 
0 -- -- 
 N 3 
(30.0%) 
6 
(100.0%) 
6 
(46.1%) 
3 
(100.0%
) 
-- -- 
        
Felony  17 
(62.5%) 
7 
(37.5%) 
15 
(62.5%) 
9 
(37.5%) 
4 
(16.7%) 
20 
(83.3%) 
        
Procedure is 
Fair 
Y -- -- 15 
(100.0%) 
2 
(22.2%) 
4 
(100.0%) 
13 
(65.0%) 
 N -- -- 0 7 
(77.8%) 
0 7 
(35.0%) 
        
Outcome is 
Fair 
Y 15 
(88.2%) 
0 -- -- 4 
(100.00%
) 
11 
(55.0%) 
 N 2 
(11.8%) 
7 
(100.0%) 
-- -- 0 9 
(45.0%) 
        
Participation Y 4 
(23.5%) 
0 4 
(26.7%) 
0 -- -- 
  N 13 
(76.4%) 
7 
(100.0%) 
11 
(73.3%) 
9 
(100.0%
) 
-- -- 
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IX. Conclusion 
 
 Research indicates that the majority of 
individuals charged with a crime plead guilty. This study 
focuses on why defendants decide to plead guilty versus 
take their case to trial and their perceptions of the plea 
process and outcomes. Our findings suggest that 
defendants decide to plead guilty, regardless of 
innocence, because the process provides the quickest 
pathway out of court and with little risk. The decision to 
enter a plea of guilty is also influenced by confusion over 
court processes and outcomes, and fear of what may 
happen if the defendant does not accept a plea deal. 
While outcomes associated with plea bargaining are 
considered by defendants to be by and large fair—
primarily because the outcome was expected and 
perceived as comparable to the outcomes that others 
receive—defendants do not always perceive the plea 
process as fair. Dissatisfaction with the legal 
representation and perceived lack of control and input in 
the decisions of their case are key factors that influence 
perceptions of procedural fairness and justice.   
 Scholars and legal practitioners often argue that 
defendants’ decisions to plead guilty reflects their guilt 
and a concern for taking responsibility for their 
behaviors. The courts—particularly federal courts—have 
supported the position that defendants should receive 
leniency in exchange for accepting blame for their 
actions.61 However, while defendant guilt may play a 
mediating effect in defendant decision-making, the 
findings of this research indicate that guilt has little 
direct effect on the decision to plead guilty. Rather, the 
efficiency that the plea process provides is a primary 
influence on defendant decision-making.  Many scholars 
argue that as the number of individuals who intersect 
with the courts increases, plea bargaining provides a 
                                               
61 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2009). 
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quick, inexpensive way to handle growing dockets.62 The 
findings of this research suggest that the plea bargaining 
process is not only preferred by court actors, but also by 
the defendants, who are also influenced by a desire to 
“just get it over with.”   
 In addition to the time and money saved by 
pleading guilty, defendants indicated that they preferred 
the certainty of plea deals. Research shows that 
defendants who decide to take their case to trial and are 
found guilty frequently receive more severe sentences 
than they would if they had pled guilty. Plea-trial 
disparity research shows that some defendants receive a 
sentence at trial that is up to ten times more severe than 
defendants with similar charges and backgrounds who 
decide to plead guilty.63 The results of this study echo 
these findings, with defendants articulating concern for 
the risk associated with taking their case to trial. Many 
defendants felt as if they were receiving a “break” or a 
                                               
62 See sources cited supra note 18. 
63 See Brian D. Johnson et al., The Social Context of Guidelines 
Circumvention: The Case of Federal District Courts, 46 
CRIMINOLOGY 737 (2008); Nancy J. King et al., When Process 
Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea, 
Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 959 (2005); McCoy, supra note 22; Darrell 
Steffensmeier & Stephen Demuth, Ethnicity and Judges’ 
Sentencing Decisions:  Hispanic-Black-White Comparisons, 39 
CRIMINOLOGY 145 (2001); Darrell Steffensmeier & Stephen 
Demuth, Ethnicity and Sentencing Outcomes in U.S. Federal 
Courts: Who is Punished More Harshly?, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 705 
(2000); Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging 
Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors and Racial Discrimination 
in Sentencing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 733 (2001); Celesta A. 
Albonetti, An Integration of Theories to Explain Judicial 
Discretion, 38 SOC. PROBS. 247 (1991); Gary D. LaFree, 
Adversarial and Nonadversarial Justice: A Comparison of 
Guilty Pleas and Trials, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1985); Ruth D. 
Peterson & John Hagan, Changing Conceptions of Race: 
Towards an Account of Anomalous Findings of Sentencing 
Research, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 56 (1984). 
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“good deal” and were not willing to take the chance that 
they may be acquitted or receive a more lenient sentence 
from a judge or jury at trial.  
 An important finding of this research is the 
influence that misunderstanding has on the decision-
making process of defendants. The findings of this study 
illustrate that defendants arrive at the decision to plead 
guilty through a series of justifications that are 
influenced by the strain of making a quick decision and a 
lack of understanding about plea bargaining, court 
procedures, and the implications of sentencing outcomes. 
Although defendants’ decisions to plead guilty may be 
adequately described by an efficiency or uncertainty 
avoidance perspective, the final decision to accept a plea 
is influenced by a combination of factors that include 
guilt, time and financial concerns, and fear. These 
considerations are mediated by a lack of understanding 
of the legal procedures and language associated with the 
court system. 
 Notably, this study is the first to examine plea 
bargain decision-making through interviews with 
defendants. In doing so, the findings advance our 
understanding of how defendants arrive at the decision 
to plead guilty and contribute to knowledge about 
whether defendants perceive the plea process and 
outcome as fair.  Prior research argues that individuals 
who perceive case proceedings as fair are more likely to 
view outcomes as fair and report overall satisfaction with 
their court experience.64 Also, procedures that provide 
defendants with the opportunity to have a voice and 
participate in the decisions made in their case are more 
likely to feel fairly treated, respected, and valued by court 
actors.65 In this study, however, most defendants did not 
report a sense of participation in their case; yet, over two-
thirds of defendants perceived both the plea procedures 
                                               
64 CASPER, supra note 24; Casper, supra note 13. 
65 Christopher Campbell et al., supra note 51, at 759; Casper, 
supra note 13. 
55
Hussemann and Siegel: Pleading Guilty
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2019
TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
VOLUME 13 | WINTER 2019 | ISSUE 2 
 
[514] 
and outcome of their case as fair. In fact, most defendants 
spoke positively about the outcomes of their case and 
believed that they received sanctions that were deserved 
and less severe than they had anticipated. Defendants 
perceived their court experience as fair because it 
mirrored other defendants’ experiences; for the most 
part, defendants felt that they were all treated the same, 
for the good and the bad.  
 Yet, defendants in this study did not necessarily 
feel that they were treated well or fairly by their public 
defenders. Defendants who expressed both positive and 
negative perceptions of public defender behavior, 
however, attributed the behavior to the social and 
situational circumstances of the courts. Attribution 
theories argue that people make distinctions between 
persons and their social situations.66 Social attributions 
occur when individual behavior is interpreted in terms of 
situational forces and, particularly, when an individual 
is a member of a group.  For example, Vincent Yzerbyt 
and Anouk Rogier argue that “social attribution is 
especially likely to be at work when perceivers believe 
that they are confronted with a clear social entity, a 
coherent whole,” and that social attribution is “of 
paramount importance for the rationalization and 
justification function of stereotypes.”67 Defendants in this 
study attributed the behaviors of public defenders to the 
“system”—public defender behavior is therefore a 
consequence of being a worker in “The Public Defender’s 
Office” which is funded by “The State” or “The System.” 
The legitimacy of public defenders as figures of authority 
                                               
66 See generally Daniel T. Gilbert, Ordinary Personology, in 2 
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 89 (Daniel T. Gilbert, 
Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
67 Vincent Yzerbyt & Anouk Rogier, Blame It on the Group: 
Entitativity, Subjective Essentialism, and Social Attribution, in 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON 
IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 103, 105 
(John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001). 
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is contextualized by defendant beliefs about the court 
system. Defendants viewed public defenders as acting 
legitimately or, at the very least, consistently in this 
social context—i.e., eager to plead defendants guilty, 
disinclined to give them much time, and not concerned 
about their welfare. In this regard, although defendants 
do not trust the motives of public defenders—because 
they are dictated by the system—they trust that they will 
receive the legal representation of an overburdened 
public defender. 
 Importantly, defendant attitudes toward the 
procedures and outcome of their case are not necessarily 
contingent on perceptions of fairness or trust of public 
defenders. Defendants do not feel as if they receive fair 
treatment or necessarily trust public defenders to 
represent their best interests, but they express 
satisfaction with the plea process and outcomes. Process-
based models of regulation state that defendants who 
lack confidence in their lawyer are not only likely to 
harbor negative feelings about the law but are also more 
likely to resist the lawyer’s and court’s advice regarding 
the implications of future non-law-abiding behavior.68 
Past research notes that defendants often lay full blame 
for the faults of the system on their public defender.69 The 
findings of this research, however, argue that defendants 
contextualize the behaviors of their public defender. 
Public defenders are criticized and often blamed by 
defendants, but they are also seen as part of a larger 
system that is out of both the public defender’s and the 
defendant’s control. Thus, the legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system is questioned by defendants more so than 
                                               
68 TYLER & HUO, supra note 31; Tyler, supra note 31, at 311; 
Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 31, at 515; Tyler & Wakslak, 
supra note 31, at 259.  
69 CASPER, supra note 24, at 85; Roy B. Flemming, Client 
Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their Relations with 
Criminal Clients, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 253, 258 (1986); 
Casper, supra note 55, at 6. 
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the actual behaviors of public defenders and the 
relationships they establish with defendants. 
 Defendant evaluations of the courts are also not 
necessarily contingent on their experiences and 
evaluations of law enforcement. Research consistently 
finds that poor individuals, especially minorities, 
embrace negative attitudes about police, which is based 
on personal experiences and the experiences of others in 
their community.70 Many scholars argue that legal 
perspectives are created through interactions with law 
enforcement; negative perceptions of police practices spill 
over to other areas of the criminal justice and political 
systems.71 Yet, this may not always be the case. In this 
project, defendants spoke unexpectedly and at length 
about police misconduct. Defendants complained first 
and foremost about their treatment by police and the 
fairness of the charges against them. This is to say that, 
for the most part, defendants blamed law enforcement for 
their status as a defendant in a criminal case and 
subsequently viewed the courts as “just doing their job.” 
This finding may be negative or positive depending on 
how it is interpreted. On the one hand, defendants can 
differentiate between criminal justice institutions, their 
role in their criminal process, and their treatment by 
criminal justice personnel, indicating that the legitimacy 
of the criminal justice and political systems are not 
necessarily always overshadowed by the actions of law 
enforcement. On the other hand, this finding may 
indicate that the poor may be so disillusioned by police 
practices that they can only interpret court experiences 
                                               
70 Elaine B. Sharp & Paul E. Johnson, Accounting for Variation 
in Distrust of Local Police, 26 JUST. Q. 157, 159–60 (2009); 
Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 37, at 781; Weitzer & Tuch 
(2002), supra note 37, at 442–43; Weitzer & Tuch (1999), supra 
note 37, at 502; Scaglion & Condon, supra note 37, at 486, 489. 
71 TYLER, supra note 42, at 95; Bobo & Thompson, supra note 
32, at 447; Bobo & Johnson, supra note 38. 
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as more positive than their experiences with the police. 
 In generalizing these findings to the total 
population of defendants, we note that this research 
relies only on adult criminal defendants located in a mid-
sized Midwestern town. Defendants in smaller or larger 
areas may have different court experiences. Sentencing 
guidelines also vary by state, and, as the first state to 
implement determinant sentencing, Minnesota may not 
reflect the practices of states that still rely on 
indeterminate sentencing practices. Sentencing rules 
and guidelines may, in turn, significantly affect 
defendant experiences and decisions. For example, 
defendants in Hennepin County speak openly about 
situating their decisions and experiences within the 
boundaries of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines (i.e. 
“the grid”). Therefore, while defendants may not feel 
satisfied with their outcome, they feel fairly treated 
because they assume that guidelines guarantee that 
similar defendants receive similar outcomes.  
 At the same time, this research includes only 
those defendants who are represented by a public 
defender. Individuals represented by public defenders 
are the largest and most socially disadvantaged 
population of defendants in the criminal courts. Unlike 
indigent defendants, affluent defendants may be more 
likely to hire a private attorney and afford the costs of 
childcare and time away from work, which defendants in 
this study indicated as key considerations to accepting a 
plea of guilty. More affluent individuals are also less 
reliant on governmental assistance, which often 
stipulates that an individual may not receive assistance 
if they have a criminal conviction. Due to these 
differences in circumstances, it is likely that the decision-
making considerations and processes of defendants in 
this research are different than the population of 
defendants who are not represented by public defenders. 
 Despite the limitations of this research, the 
implications are significant. This research shows that 
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defendants plead guilty because they are confused, 
scared, and feel coerced. Since plea bargaining was first 
implemented over a century ago, scholars have argued 
that the process creates a coercive atmosphere for 
defendants—defendants feel that they have to plead 
guilty or risk receiving a more severe sentence at trial, 
even if they are innocent.72 The findings of this research 
support this argument, with defendants expressing fear 
of taking their case to trial. Even those defendants who 
originally enter a plea of not guilty with the intention to 
pursue a trial ultimately plead guilty out of fear that the 
outcome at trial might result in more significant 
consequences. While Minnesota does not have a strict 
guideline rule that reduces sentences for those who plead 
guilty, public defenders rely heavily on sentencing 
guidelines and grids to illustrate minimum and 
maximum sentences to defendants. Public defenders may 
not insist that defendants take a plea bargain; however, 
they do adamantly remind defendants that if they do not 
accept a plea, they may go to trial and receive the 
maximum sentence. In the most direct situations, 
defenders openly inform defendants that the judge has 
indicated that if they take the case to trial, that they will 
be given the maximum sentence allowed by law. 
 Our findings also indicate that fairness is not 
monolithic and can take on different meanings across 
individuals who are accused of a crime. For example, 
defendants in this study were most likely to associate the 
even distribution of justice—outcomes and procedures—
with fairness. This finding is contrary to research by 
Tyler and colleagues that found that defendants did not 
define their experience based on their ability to 
participate and have input in the procedures of their 
                                               
72 Bowers, supra note 22, at 1120; McCoy, supra note 22, at 69; 
Bibas, supra note 7, at 2531; Langbein, supra note 10, at 16 
(citing People v. Byrd, 162 N.W.2d 777, 787 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1968) (Levin, J., concurring)). 
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case.73 Most frequently, defendants relied on the fair 
application of the law in their case. This result is 
particularly compelling when considered in light of 
research showing disparity in arrests and sentencing 
severity between black and white individuals and, 
particularly, those charged with drug and property 
offenses.74 This finding may be less surprising, however, 
when we consider that the poor are far more likely to be 
the subject of unfair and discriminatory treatment on a 
daily basis and in their own communities. As Merry 
argues, most lower-class Americans believe that society 
is unfair, unjust, and that everyone’s rights are not 
equally protected.75 Therefore, when poor defendants 
receive unsatisfactory treatment from the courts, they 
are not alienated—they are perhaps not even aware of 
being treated unfairly—because the experience is similar 
to experiences with other state actors and institutions.76 
As some of the most socially marginalized individuals in 
our society, poor defendants do not expect to have a voice 
or to receive the same treatment as individuals with more 
social status. They do not have the expectation that law 
officials will give them and their story adequate 
consideration, and they do not consider criminal courts 
as a space in which their self-value and identity is 
defined.   
 Perhaps the most important implication of this 
                                               
73 LIND & TYLER, supra note 27, at 216; Tyler & Bies, supra note 
54, at 89. 
74 DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER THE LAW: RACE IN 
THE WAR ON DRUGS (2007); WESTERN, supra note 36, at 50. 
75 Sally E. Merry, Concepts of Law and Justice Among Working-
Class Americans: Ideology as Culture, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 59, 68–
69 (1985). 
76 JOE SOSS ET AL., DISCIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL 
PATERNALISM AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE 181 (2011); 
COLE, supra note 36, at 8; Austin Sarat, “. . . The Law Is All 
Over”: Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the 
Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 374 (1990). 
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research, therefore, is that criminal justice reforms are 
needed to ensure the rights of indigent defendants. Once 
indigent defendants are swept into the criminal courts, 
they are required to navigate a system that they do not 
understand. Defendants are required to make quick 
decisions that have significant implications on their lives, 
families, and communities; however, their decisions are 
bounded by limited information and an incomplete 
comprehension of the procedures and meanings of 
sentences. Plea bargaining allows agents of the court to 
move through cases quickly and rationalize that plea 
bargains are fair because defendants make the decision 
to plead guilty. This research shows that we should not 
presume such a simplistic and idealistic conclusion. 
Future research should consider how we can strengthen 
the position of defendants by providing defendants access 
to dispositional advisors, or staff that are available to 
counsel defendants about their decision-making 
processes. If courts are not capable of providing 
defendants adequate representation and informed 
decision-making, this research suggests that we need to 
reconceptualize the meaning of “fairness” in the court 
system.   
 Finally, this research speaks to the current state 
of our criminal courts and their reliance on the plea 
process. Over the past few decades, scholars have focused 
on sentencing, incarceration, and the reentry of 
prisoners, to the neglect of investigations into indigent 
defense representation and the processes of criminal 
courts. The lack of attention to and investment in 
ensuring the rights of defendants and the quality of legal 
representation is startling considering the continued 
support for “tough on crime” policies that increase the 
stakes for a staggering number of individuals whose lives 
are affected by the courts. Yet, and in despite of these 
changes, this research offers evidence that indicates that 
defendant attitudes have remained relatively stable over 
time. In particular, the results of this research 
complement early studies of defendants. In the 1970s, 
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Casper noted that not only did defendants speak 
positively about the plea process, but that most 
defendants preferred to “cop out” and accept a plea: “the 
defendant doesn’t see himself as giving up anything of 
great value: he is simply speaking words, and they don’t 
seem to mean very much.”77 Although interactions with 
the criminal justice system and the severity of sanctions 
have increased, it does not appear to be the case that 
defendant experiences or expectations of what the courts 
can offer has changed much at all.   
 Future research and policy reforms should focus 
attention to increasing defendants’ understanding of 
their court experiences. We should also consider how 
defendant attitudes towards the fairness of their 
procedures and outcomes vary over time. As time passes, 
defendants may learn new information about court 
processes or experience the ramifications of their 
disposition in different ways. Consequences of criminal 
cases that have additional impacts over time may lead 
people to reconsider their fairness evaluations. As one 
defendant indicated, “At the time it was really about 
being fair. I mean, I don’t really know looking back on it 
if I consider it to be a fair deal. But at the time, it was 
just kinda like . . . what I get is what I get type of thing.”  
 This research offers a unique and important 
perspective of our courts. In doing so, it begs the question 
whether we should be expecting more from our courts or 
be satisfied to know that most defendants perceive their 
treatment as “fair enough.” In many regards, it is 
possible that most defendants cannot even conceptualize 
what “justice” might look like in the court system, given 
that the majority are represented by attorneys who are 
overworked, underpaid, and have little time to give 
adequate attention to each case. Given the infrequency of 
trials, most defendants have no point of comparison to 
the plea process. This is difficult to assess, but it is 
                                               
77 CASPER, supra note 24, at 85. 
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conceivable that if we increased our expectations of fair 
treatment by law enforcement and other institutional 
actors, the standards of court experiences would not be 
set so low. This research asserts that most defendants are 
satisfied with the procedures and outcomes of their cases, 
but it does not imply that defendants perceive the court 
system to care about their well-being or the implications 
of court sanctions on their lives.  
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